How to hide real ip when using telephony(sip)?

Question

SIP

There is a task. Hide real ip address when using ip-telephony . Moreover, options with vpn (double, triple, etc.) are not considered. This whole tangle can be unraveled. I originally wanted to send voice traffic through tor or i2p. The problem is that the resulting technology is unstable. When using the same torus when rebuilding chains, the connection naturally breaks. Then an idea arose. What if you take several of your servers , raise your relays and output node there and disable chain rebuilding, for example.
In this case, we say goodbye to security?! Or not?! Because after the creation of repeaters, they will also be publicly available and people using Tor will use one of several servers to build their chain in Tor. We will always use the same chain , and in theory, if they begin to unravel the chain of the torus (the very principle of the "onion" will interfere with this), then a bunch of connections will come to each server and it will not be possible to understand who is coming from.
Or am I thinking wrong? I just don't really rummage in the torus and traffic.Therefore, I would like to hear advice from a specialist.PS
I immediately want to discard the options: why do you need it, no one will bother, use vpn

Answer 1

But what if you make your own repeater, which will emulate the side of the opponent.
You install 2 such repeaters, and between them traffic can go any way and anywhere. And even tear.
That. The images of the opponent have a permanent connection with each other (the repeater), and the internal implementation of the transport - this should not bother any of the subscribers.

Answer 2

you need a pigeon mail then

Answer 3

1. It is extremely difficult to find a VPS that allows running a Tor exit node (did you ever wonder why there are not so many of these nodes all over the world?).
   
2. It is even more difficult to pay it anonymously. You will need someone else's credit card ... (it takes a long time to explain here), but it will be MUCH easier to reach you through the chain of money transactions than through the VPN chain.
   
3. Raising an exit node will immediately attract the attention of intelligence agencies around the world to this IP. Controlling traffic leaving Tor is their job. The entire connection will be logged (by multiple stakeholders). Before that, you were an unnecessary ordinary anonymous to anyone. Now you are the owner of the exit node, it's like performing on stage in front of a huge hall.
   
4. So, you went through registration when buying a server, installed software there, set it up, tested it ... So by this moment, the network activity profile from your real IP is already quite strongly correlated with the activity profile on this server. All over the world , it is becoming crowded that there are fewer and fewer addresses with such a high level of correlation. This means that people who own traffic statistics already quite accurately imagine where this output node is controlled from.
   
5. Well, and most importantly (where you should start): Tor does not protect against timing attacks on real-time communications. And SIP, by definition, is real-time communication, hence is subject to timing attacks through Tor (and any low latency networks/tunnels).
   

Answer 4

Read about SBC. What is it in IP telephony and what can it be built on.