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How many accounts should an administrator have?
Imagine this situation:
There are several administrators and IT employees with elevated rights in the domain infrastructure.
Everyday tasks are all performed with the rights of a simple user. In order not to compromise the domain administrator account (UA), its use is only allowed for tasks where domain administrator rights are required. For IT employees who must have local administrator rights (for example, to install software) on their own or other PCs, a separate (3rd) domain account is created, which has local administrator rights on domain PCs.
IT employees also have administrative access to various systems, such as antivirus, 1C, authentication server, etc. They all use domain authentication.
On the one hand, it is logical to use a simple user's KM for these systems, since this is: 1) not the task of a domain administrator 2) not a task of a local administrator. On the other hand, the KM of a simple user is not at all simple.
What is your opinion on how to properly organize administrators' access to IT systems with domain authentication?
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Set up admin groups like antivirus_rw, freepbx_rw, register these groups in your services as admin groups and assign groups to the right employees.
That's right - use a separate or separate accounts for system administrators and in no case add any additional rights to the accounts under which they log in to their computers.
How many such additional accounts there will be depends on tasks, infrastructure, levels, etc.
How many accounts should an administrator have?
It is very good when different levels of admin privileges have different accounts and their rights do not overlap (at the highest level of administration). If one is compromised, the rest remain. If the administrator goes everywhere with one account, then one day he will merge it somewhere.
To users - yes, allocate local administrators. And I would also recommend that local admins close the network login to workstations. Otherwise, one day you will catch a worm that will infect the entire network from one admin.
1C, antivirus, etc. - this is definitely a user and his account, but internal inter-server affairs, for example, between 1C and SQL servers - there is a separate one, maybe even not connected with the domain. And in general one should dance in such products from their specific safety recommendations. Often, an admin account is not required for the interaction of different services when it is correctly configured.
In general, put yourself in the place of an attacker who bought on the network a database of your organization's accounts compromised by phishing and trojans, ransomware and exploits against antiviruses. Just imagine that he can now enter remotely, and when he enters, he will use another tool - the brain. He will look around and do everything right, so that later you burn out and there was no other way out, how to pay a ransom.
Think in terms of this paradigm. The strengths and weaknesses of your decisions in the light of this approach are immediately much clearer. The real goals and objectives are immediately visible ...
Well, in the end - AD provides any desired degree of abstraction of rights. Somewhere it is necessary to register users by name in access, and somewhere to use several nested groups.
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